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SECTION 7 CLAYTON ACT REMEDIESTHE RESCISSION DECISION
Once a federal court finds that a merger is anticompetitive,
thereby violating section 7 of the Clayton Act,1 a crucial phase of
the litigation begins; the court must attempt to fashion a remedy
that restores the industry to its competitive status quo ante.2 As
the Supreme Court has recognized, "the suit has been a futile
exercise if the government proves a [section 7] violation but fails
to secure a remedy adequate to redress it." 3 In an attempt to
provide an effective remedy, courts have consistently ordered divestiture. 4 Legal scholars have noted, however, that divestiture
often fails to secure effective relief.5
This Note explores an alternative form of structural antimerger relief available in suits brought by the government 6 Section 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)) states in part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly.
2 The Supreme Court in United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S.
316 (1961), said that the key to an antitrust remedy "is of course the discovery of measures
effective to restore competition.... (C]ourts are authorized, indeed required, to decree
relief effective to redress the violations .. " Id. at 326.
3 Id. at 323.
4 The Supreme Court characterized divestiture as "the most important of antitrust
remedies" and stated that "[lt should always be in the forefront of a court's mind when a
violation of § 7 [of the Clayton Act] has been found." Id. at 330-31.
Section 11 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 21 (1976)) explicitly authorizes regulatory
agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission, to order divestiture against § 7 violators.
- See notes 67-73 and accompanying text infra.
6 Structural remedies are available only in public antimerger actions. ITT v. General
Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 920-24 (9th Cir. 1975), noted in Note, Divestiture Is Not an
Available Remedy in Private Action under Section 16 of Clayton Act, 25 CATH. L. REv. 167
(1975); NBO Ind. Treadway Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 278-79 (3d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977). Contra, Fuchs Sugars & Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp., 402
F. Supp. 636, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976)) provides
for enforcement by both private individuals and the federal government. A private party
may seek treble damages under § 4 (15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)), or an injunction under § 16
(15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976)). The government may seek imposition of criminal sanctions, such
as fines or incarceration, under § 14 (15 U.S.C. § 24 (1976)), or injunctive relief under § 15
(15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976)). For a list of other, more exotic equitable remedies considered by
Congress (including denying the antitrust violator the use of the courts, the mails, and the
Panama Canal), see K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW
AND ECONOMICS 17-29 (1976).
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rescission. Divestiture requires the buyer of the target 7 to resell it
on the open market. Rescission forces the purchaser to sell the
target back to the original owner, who in turn must repurchase it
for the original consideration. 8 In other words, rescission is divestiture to a predetermined party under predetermined terms.
Before a court orders rescission as an antimerger remedy, it
must answer three questions affirmatively. First, is the court empowered to retain the target seller as a defendant and grant relief
against him? Second, is a rescission order within the court's equitable jurisdiction? And third, is rescission a feasible and economically wise remedy?
I
Is

THE SELLER A PROPER DEFENDANT?

To rescind a merger, a court orders the target seller to return
the consideration received in exchange for return of the target.9
For a court to grant such relief, it must first retain the target
seller as a party. A strict reading of section 7 of the Clayton Act,
however, reveals that the section does not proscribe the target seller's conduct.' 0 The section speaks only to buyers; only an illegal
acquisition violates section 7." Lower courts have adopted this
7 In this Note, "target" is the stock or assets sold by one party to the transaction and
acquired by the other party. This term derives from premerger jargon where it refers to
the stock or assets that the potential purchaser seeks to acquire.
' For example, assume Corporation A acquires the stock of Corporation B for
$1,000,000 in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act. Under a divestiture order, Corporation A
must sell the stock to a third party. Under a rescission order, Corporation A must sell the
stock back to Corporation B for the original sale price of $1,000,000.
' See McIntyre v. KDI Corp., 406 F. Supp. 592, 597 (S.D. Ohio 1975); 3 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1793 (1961); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 65 (1937).
10 Section 7 of the Clayton Act states in pertinent part that "[no corporation engaged
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (emphasis added).
in commerce shall acquire.
11 There is no evidence that Congress by its use of the word "acquire," intended to
exclude target sellers from the reach of § 7. See In re Dean Foods Co., 70 F.T.C. 1146,
1291 (1966).
Congress used the term "acquire" perhaps in recognition of the particular evil that § 7
was designed to cure, the holding company. Holding companies were huge corporations
whose primary purpose was to acquire and control stock of other corporations. To eliminate holding companies, Congress proscribed their modus operandi-acquiring stock of
other corporations. See H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1914). For a discussion
of the 1914 legislative history of the Clayton Act, see D. MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE
CLAYTON ACT, ch. 2 (1950). Congress amended § 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950 to proscribe
anticompetitive asset, as well as stock, acquisitions. See Clayton Act Amendment of 1950,
Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (amending Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat.
731); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962); Note, The Amendment
to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 46 ILL. L. REv. 444 (1951); Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A
Legislative Histoy, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 766 (1952).
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strict ihterpretation and concluded that a target seller does not
violate section 7 and cannot be retained solely under its authority. a2 Nonetheless, by employing section 15 of the Clayton Act 13
in conjunction with Section 7, courts may retain target sellers as
defendants in public 14 antitrust actions. Section 15 states in part:
Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any such
proceeding may be pending that the ends of justice require that
other parties should be brought before the court, the court may
cause them to be summoned whether they reside in the district
in which the court is held or not, and subpoenas to that end
may be served in any district by the marshall thereof. 5
Lower courts have concluded that in enacting this sentence of
section 15, "Congress invoked the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts and provided that when the interest of justice requires,
[the target seller] can be joined in proceedings under the
act .. ." 16 The Supreme Court has yet to consider the question
7
directly.'
12 See United States v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 575 F.2d 222, 227 (9th Cir.) ("[bly its
express terms § 7 proscribes only the act of acquiring, not selling"), cert. denied sub nor.
Aqua Media, Ltd. v. United States, 99 S. Ct. 362 (1978); Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc.,
380 F.2d 484, 488 (5th Cir. 1967); Record Club of America, Inc. v. Capitol Records, Inc.,
[1971] Trade Cas.
73,694, at 90,900 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
13 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976).
11 Section 15 provides, in part, that "it shall be the duty of the several United States
attorneys ... under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to
prevent and restrain such violations." 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976) (emphasis added). Courts have
dismissed private suits, brought under the Clayton Act (see note 6 supra), seeking damages
or injunctions against target sellers. See Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484,
488 (5th Cir. 1967); Record Club of America, Inc. v. Capitol Records, Inc., [1971] Trade
Cas.
73, 694, at 90,900 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
15 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976).
'6 United States v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 575 F.2d 222, 228 (9th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Aqua Media, Ltd. v. United States, 99 S. Ct. 362 (1978). See United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1262 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906
(1974); United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 177 F. Supp. 1, 11 (N.D. Ill.
1959), rev'd on other grounds, 366 U.S. 316 (1961). Cf. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.,
183 F. Supp. 220, 221-22 (E.D. Wis. 1960) (without citing § 15, court retained seller as
party because "relief might be granted against them"); In re Dean Foods Co., 70 F.T.C.
1146, 1290-91 (1966) (court retained seller under § 5 of Federal Trade Commission Act).
17 The Supreme Court has only alluded to this issue in dicta. In United States v. E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 607 (1957), the Court concluded that duPont's
1923 purchase of General Motors Stock from General Motors violated § 7 of the Clayton
Act. On remand, the district court granted relief against duPont and General Motors.
United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 177 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. IIl. 1959). On appeal,
the Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded, stating that General
Motors "will thus be able to renew, for the District Court's decision in the first instance,
any objections they may have to the power of the Court to grant relief against them."

19791

RESCISSION DECISION

739

Legislative history, however, may obstruct this simple resolution of the issue. The 1914 legislators, without comment, lifted
the quoted portion of section 15 of the Clayton Act verbatim from
section 5 of the Sherman Act.' 8 Although the Clayton Act Congress did not elaborate on the purpose behind this language, the
1890 Sherman Act legislature had. Proponents of the Sherman
Act explained that they intended section 5 to facilitate antitrust
enforcement in two ways. First, section 5 granted a court power to
"bring in [Sherman Act violators] wherever they reside or whereever they are doing business and have as full and complete jurisdiction over them upon publication as if they voluntarily appeared
in the action." 19 Second, section 5 allowed a court "vigorous and
drastic use of the writ of injunction" by providing for service
anywhere in the United States.2" Thus, Congress intended section 5 to extend a federal court's in personam jurisdiction, enabling
a single court to resolve all issues related to each antitrust violation. Section 5 did not increase the number of parties against
whom relief could be granted; its purpose was to reduce the
number of actions required to effect that relief.
This hurdle is not insurmountable. The 1914 drafters were
not bound by the interpretation given to the language by the 1890
legislature, 2 1 even if they were aware of it. 22 It strains the
boundaries of statutory construction to assume that the Clayton
Act Congress intended to perpetuate this twenty-four year old
limit on the section's plain meaning without ever mentioning the
operative legislative history. The wiser assumption is that the drafters of the Clayton Act did not even consider this limitation; although they did not explicitly sanction retaining target sellers as
defendants, neither did they preclude the practice. The drafters

United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316; 334-35 (1961). The Court
has left the question open.
1s 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1976).
19 21 CONG. Rc. 2640 (1890).
20 Id. at 2640-41.
21 See 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.15 (4th ed. 1973).

But cf. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) ("[Tlhere ... Congress adopts a new
law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had
knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law").
2 The problem of retaining target sellers as defendants does not arise under § 5 of the
Sherman Act since the Act proscribes the conduct of a/ parties attempting anticompetitive
collusion. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). The language in § 5, therefore, did not limit enforcement
of the Sherman Act, but rather extended it. The Clayton Act legislature may not have
foreseen that the same language might present a bar to effective antitrust relief under the
Clayton Act.
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left the question open for future judicial interpretation and thus
courts are correct in concluding they may bring in target sellers as
defendants under section 15.
Section 15's requirement of 'Justice" implicates equitable notions that may limit the court's power to implement rescission,
even when it is the only effective antimerger remedy. The target
seller has not violated any section of the Clayton Act.2" But
equity should permit a court to retain as defendants all persons
who were parties to an anticompetitive merger transaction, because of their collective responsibility for the section 7 violation.
Both the buyer and the target seller typically have either actual
notice 24 or constructive notice 2 5 prior to the merger that it may
violate section 7 and that the government may challenge it once
consummated. A court, therefore, could retain the target seller as
a defendant in a section 7 action without contravening fairness
notions inherent in equity.
23 See notes 10-11 and accompanying text supra.
24 The government may inform the parties to the transaction that it intends to chal-

lenge the merger if they consummate it. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384
U.S. 270, 279 (1966). The parties may also seek premerger clearance of the transaction. See
1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 4230 (1977). The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, Title II, 90 Stat. 1383, should increase the number of
cases where parties have actual notice that the proposed merger will violate § 7. The Act
amends the Clayton Act by requiring that the parties to a proposed merger provide premerger notification to the government and observe a 30-day waiting period before consummating the merger. Proposed mergers are covered by the Act when, in simplified
form, the target seller has at least $10,000,000 in annual net sales or total assets and the
buyer has at least $100,000,000 in annual net sales or total assets. For a discussion of the
Act, see Kinter, Griffin & Goldston, The Hart-Scott-RodinoAntitrust Improvements Act of 1976:
An Analysis, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1977).
2s In 1968, the Department of Justice promulgated guidelines to "acquaint the business
community [and] the legal profession .... with the standards currently being applied by the
Department of Justice in determining whether to challenge corporate acquisitions and
mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act." I TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510.1 (1971).
The Department of Justice will "ordinarily challenge" a horizontal merger (between directly competing firms) where the industry is "highly concentrated", i.e., where the four
largest firms together account for 75% or more of total industry sales, and where the
combined market shares of the acquiring and acquired firms are between 8% and 16% or
greater. See id. 4510.5. If the industry is not "highly concentrated," then the Department
will "ordinarily challenge" horizontal mergers where the combined market shares are between 10% and 26% or greater. See id. 4510.6. In the case of vertical mergers (between
supplier and purchaser), the guidelines warn that the Department will "ordinarily challenge" the merger if the supplying firm accounts for 10% or more of the sales in the
market and the purchasing firm accounts for 6% or more of the purchases in that market.
See id. 4510.12.
United States v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 575 F.2d 222 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Aqua Media, Ltd. v. United States, 99 S. Ct. 362 (1978), is an excellent example of how
these guidelines should have given notice to the parties that the proposed merger violated
§ 7. In Coca-Cola, the parties consummated a horizontal merger where their shares of the
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II
Is

RESCISSION AN ANTIMERGER REMEDY
AVAILABLE TO THE COURT?

Even if a federal court has the power to grant relief against
the target seller, it must still decide whether the remedy of rescission lies within its equitable jurisdiction. A court must recognize
that the use of rescission as an antimerger remedy is radically different from the remedy's traditional application. Under traditional analysis, rescission is a private contract remedy; one of the
parties to a contract seeks to abrogate the contract on grounds of
26
fraud, misrepresentation, mistake, or failure of consideration.
The use of rescission as a public antimerger remedy is novel and
must stand on legal principles distinct from those which traditionally support its invocation.
27
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
was the first and only court to consider this issue directly. 28 Relying on broad precedents authorizing liberal use of equity power,
the court concluded that an independent foundation for rescission
does exist.2 9 The court stated that "[t]he equity jurisdiction of

three potentially relevant markets were 51% and 26%, 9% and 81%, and 36% and 449'.
respectively. See United States v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., No. 76-3988-LTL (C.D. Cal., filed
Apr. 27, 1977) (unreported district court findings), reprinted in Brief for Appellant Aqua
Media, Ltd., App. II, at 19-20, United States v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 575 F.2d 222 (9th
Cir. 1978). These two firms alone constituted a "highly concentrated" market and their
combined market shares exceed by 26 to 44 times the limits established in the guidelines.
See 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 4510.5 (1971). These guidelines should have warned the
parties that the government would challenge the merger once consummated. See In re
Dean Foods, 70 F.T.C. 1146, 1293-94 (1966).
26 See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 254-56 (1973); RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION (1937); G. WEBB, EQUITY 155-61 (1970).
27 575 F.2d 222 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Aqua Media, Ltd. v. United States, 99 S.
Ct. 362 (1978).
28 The court in Coca-Cola considered the availability of rescission only in the context of
a preliminary injunction to restrain the target seller from distributing the remaining proceeds of the sale to its shareholders pendente lite. The court stated that it could deny the
injunction only if "under no conceivable circumstances could a final decree involving
rescission be permissable." 575 F.2d at 231. Holding that rescission was legally available,
the court sustained the injunction pending a determination that rescission was appropriate.
Id. at 230-32.
29 Id. at 228. The court relied on Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S.
288, 291-92 (1960) ("power of equity to provide complete relief' authorizes order to
employer to reimburse back wages to wrongfully discharged employee); International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400-01 (1947) (courts "are invested with large discretion
to model their [antitrust] judgment to fit the exigencies of the particular case"); Hecht Co.
v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (equity jurisdiction is the power "to do equity and to
mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case").
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the federal courts traditionally has permitted the fashioning of
broad and flexible decrees molded to the necessities of the particular case." 3' This jurisdiciton is even broader and more flexible in a case that implicates a public interest, like economic competition. 3 1 The Coca-Cola court briefly considered two additional
precedents arguing for a court's power to invoke rescission as a
public antimerger remedy-United States v. E.L duPont de Nemours
33
& Co.3 2 and Ford Motor Co. v. Unite.d States.
In duPont, the Supreme Court rejected the partial divestiture
remedy approved by the district court and instead ordered complete divestiture. In mandating this harsher remedy, the Court
emphasized that courts are "authorized, indeed required, to decree relief effective" to restore competition.3 4 This demand for
effectiveness will justify other structural antimerger remedies, including rescission, in appropriate cases.3 5 The duPont Court also
reasoned that "[t]he very words of [section 7] suggest that an undoing of the acquistion is a natural remedy." 36 Rescission, even
more than divestiture, returns the market to its pre-acquisition
state. Finally, duPont states that "once the government has successfully borne the considerable burden of establishing a violation ...,
all doubts as to the remedy are to be resolved in its favor." 37 The
The Coca-Cola court also relied on J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), where
the Court rescinded a merger induced by fraud, stating that "it is the duty of the courts to
be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional
purpose." Id. at 433. The issue in Borak was "whether § 27 of the [Securities Exchange Act
(15 U.S.C. § 78a (1976))] authorizes a federal cause of action for rescission ...to a corporate stockholder with respect to a consummated merger which was authorized pursuant to
the use of a [false and misleading] proxy statement." Id. at 428. The Court held that under
these circumstances rescission was within the court's equitable jurisdiction. This decision,
however, merely reaffirmed the traditional use of rescission in private suits involving fraud
or misrepresentation. See note 26 and accompanying text supra. As the Coca-Cola court
recognized, Borak did not consider the availability of rescission as a public antimerger remedy. See 575 F.2d at 230 n.8. Nonetheless, Borak does demonstrate that there is nothing
inherently exotic about mergers that prevents courts from rescinding them.
30 575 F.2d at 228.

31Id. (citing Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946)). See Virginia
R.R. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937)(action seeking to compel employer
to bargain with union: "[c]ourts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to
give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to
go when only private interests are involved").
32 366 U.S. 316 (1961). For a brief discussion of duPmot's procedural history, see note
17 supra.
33 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
34 366 U.S. at 326.
'- The circumstances in which rescission is an effective antimerger remedy are described in notes 65-81 and accompanying text infra.
36 366 U.S. at 329.

37Id. at 334.
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government's request for rescission is, therefore, presumptively
appropriate.
The Court's holding in Ford Motor Co. v. United States 38 implies that rescission is available as an antimerger remedy. In Ford,
the Court upheld the lower court's determination that Ford's acquisition of a portion of the assets of Electric Autolite, a spark
plug manufacturer, violated section 7 and approved a battery of
equitable remedies designed to allow the target "an opportunity to
establish its competitive position." 3 9 The relief included a divestiture order, a ten-year injunction prohibiting Ford from manufacturing spark plugs, and an order requiring Ford to purchase fifty
percent of its spark plugs from the divested company for five
years.4 0 these extraordinary remedies 4 1 drastically interfered with
the competitive structure of the industry. 42 The remedies foreclosed Ford from actively competing in the industry and thus were
potentially anticompetitive themselves. 43 Nonetheless, the Court
approved the remedies because they were "needed to restore and
encourage the competition adversely affected by the acquisition."4
Rescission is a much tamer remedy than the relief granted in
Ford.4 5 Ideally, it merely reinstates the premerger market structure and, unlike the Ford remedies, does not eliminate a potential
competitor. Nor does it require extensive court supervision or review, one of the major stumbling blocks to a court's invocation of
its equitable powers; 46 the court merely reverses the terms of the
original transaction. 47 Since the court approved the Ford antimerger remedies, it would likely accept a less intrusive but effective remedy like rescission.
38 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
39 United States v. Ford Motor Co., 315 F. Supp. 372, 378 (E.D. Mich. 1970)(supplemental opinion), aff'd 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
40 The decree also prohibited Ford from using its own trade name on spark plugs for 5
years, and protected the target's employees by requiring Ford to continue selling spark
plugs to its dealers at the suggested prevailing minimum prices for 10 years, and to condition its divestiture sale on the purchaser's assuming existing wage and pension obligations.
See 405 U.S. at 572.
41 See id. at 581 (concurring opinion, Stewart, J.).
42 See id. at 582, 591 (concurring and dissenting opinion, Burger, C.J.) (remedies "drastic" and "go far beyond any that have been cited to the court").
43 See id. at 591-92 (concurring and dissenting opinion, Burger, C.J.).
44 Id. at 578.

4- A court could, of course, supplement its rescission order with orders similar to those
used in Ford.
46 See D. DOBBS, supra note 26, at 63; G. WEBB, supra note 26, at 56-57.
47 See note 9 and accompanying text supra; note 60 and accompanying text infra.
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III
Is

RESCISSION A WISE REMEDY?

Even if a court has the power to rescind a merger, the question remains whether it should exercise this power. The answer
depends in each case upon the feasibility and effectiveness of rescission.
A. Feasibility
Since rescission normally requires each party to the merger to
return the consideration respectively received, 48 it is feasible only
if both parties still exist after the merger. 49 In many mergers,
one party sells all its stock or assets to the purchaser and is
thereby dissolved; 50 the target seller no longer exists and can
51
neither accept the target nor return the consideration received.
Although the former shareholders of the dissolved seller may still
be available, a court may not order them to refund the consideration distributed to them or to re-incorporate and receive the
target back because they were not parties to the original transac52
tion and thus are not proper defendants.
48 See note 8 supra.
49 The ideal merger for invoking rescission is a conglomerate cash-for-asset acquisition

of the functioning subsidiary of another conglomerate. Both parties to the transaction still
exist and are large relative to the transaction. The discrete and functioning nature of the
target tends to deter intermingling. Stock-for-stock mergers or stock acquisitions present
the possibility that the stock will be sold to third parties thereby rendering rescission infeasible. See note 55 infra.
50 Cf McIntyre v. KDI Corp., 406 F. Supp. 592, 597-98 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (court could
not order rescission in securities fraud action because acquired corporation no longer
existed).
51 In cases where the corporate seller may dissolve or where rescission or divestiture
are not effective, it may be appropriate for the government to seek a preliminary injunction under § 15 to enjoin the consummation of the merger. If the government proves a § 7
violation at trial, the merger can be permanently enjoined. See United States v. Wilson
Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968). For discussions of the use of a
preliminary injunction to prevent the consummation of a merger that violates § 7, see
Elzinga, Mergers: Their Causes and Cures, 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 53, 83-93 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Causes and Cures]; Lewis, PreliminaryInjunctions in Government Section 7
Litigation, 17 ANTITRUtST BULL. 1 (1972); Pfunder, Plaine & Wittemore, Compliance with Divestiture Orders under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: An Analysis of the Relief Obtained, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 19, 115-23 (1972); Note, PreliminaryRelief for the Government under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, 79 HARV. L. REv. 391 (1965). The premerger notification requirements in
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (Pub. L. No. 94-435, Title II,
90 Stat. 1383, 1390-94) should provide the government with the opportunity, in more
cases, to seek a preliminary injunction before the consummation of a merger. See note 24
supra.
'2 See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
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Even when the parties still exist, rescission may not be feasible
if one of them has spent, sold, or otherwise committed the consideration received. If the surviving seller is small compared to
the sale in question, he may be unable to amass sufficient funds,
by either loan or liquidation, to repurchase the target. For example, in United States v. Coca-ColaBottling Co., 53 the target seller had

distributed two-thirds of the net sale proceeds to its own
shareholders by the time the government filed its complaint. The
Coca-Cola court suggested, in dicta, that the seller need only return to the buyer that consideration which he had not already
54
distributed, with the difference absorbed by the buyer as a loss.
This solution, however, borders on unjust enrichment of the seller
and, in practice, may induce sellers, anticipating a rescission order, to dispose of merger proceeds immediately. Sounder analysis
dictates that the court deny rescission as infeasible in cir55
cumstances like these.
Excessive intermingling of the target assets with the seller's
original assets may also render rescission impracticable. As with
divestiture, a court must unscramble the merger and decide what
assets should be resold. The government must initiate its complaint quickly to forestall this intermingling; unfortunately, it
rarely does. A 1969 study concluded that the average time between acquisition and complaint was 10.6 or 19.0 months, depending on the federal agency involved. 56 When the government
files its complaint, it may seek a hold-separate order to maintain

53 575 F.2d 222 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub noma.Aqua Media, Ltd. v. United States, 99 S.
Ct. 362 (1978).
54 Id. at 231.
55 Mills v. Electric Auto-lite Co., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
93,354 (N.D. Ill. 1972) is another example of the infeasibility of rescission where one
party to the merger has sold the consideration received. There, plaintiffs brought a private
action alleging fraud and seeking rescission of a stock-for-stock merger. By the time the
plaintiffs filed suit, however, one-half of the stock exchanged in the merger had been sold
to third parties. The district court held as a matter of law that rescission was inappropriate
because it "would not be practicable to attempt to trace the stock transactions involving...
shares which have been traded on the New York Stock Exchange and over-the-counter."
Id. at 91,900. Cf. Harmen v. Diversified Medical Inv. Corp., 524 F.2d 361, 364 (10th Cir.
1975) (where stock sold, buyer in private suit could rescind stock-for-stock merger by substituting cash for stock).
5' See Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J.L. & ECON. 43, 52 (1969).
Elzinga also concluded that the average delay between complaint and implementation of
the remedy was approximately 52 years. Id. A delay of this length may require the court
to "uncook" as well as unscramble the merger. The obvious solution to this problem of
delay is a hold-separate order. See note 57 and accompanying text infra.
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the availability of rescission pendente lite." Such orders typically
require the buyer to maintain the acquired assets as a separate
functioning unit and prohibit the target seller from spending or
unduly burdening the consideration it received. 58 Without a
timely hold-separate order, the buyer tends to integrate his administration and use of the target with his original assets 5 9 and
0
make improvements to the target.
The nature of the target also plays a role in determining the
extent of intermingling likely to occur. If the target is a distinct
entity, such as a functioning firm or plant, the buyer need not
assimilate the assets to realize the target's value; some targets,
however, are valuable only when integrated into the buyer's exist61
ing operations.
In sum, rescission is feasible only when: (1) both parties still
exist after the merger; (2) the seller still has, or can raise, the
consideration he received; (3) the government promptly obtains a
hold-separate order; and (4) the nature of the target tends to
57 For discussions advocating the use of a hold-separate order, see Lewis, supra note 51,
at 10-13; Note, supra note 51, 79 HARV. L. REV. at 394-401 (1965). But cf. Causes and Cures,
supra note 51, at 91-92 (noting defects in "No Comingling" agreements); Pfunder, Plaine &
Wittemore, supra note 51, at 77 n.85 (keep-separate orders only partly responsive to problems created by integration).
58 See, e.g., United States v. ITT, 306 F. Supp. 766, 799-802 (D. Conn. 1969) (detailed
hold-separate order); United States v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 575 F.2d 222, 231 (9th Cir.)
(enjoining seller from distributing proceeds of sale), cert. denied sub nom. Aqua Media, Ltd.
v. United States, 99 S. Ct. 362 (1978).
" But see Elzinga, supra note 56, at 53-54; Pfunder, Plaine & Wittemore, supra note 51,
at 76-77, 87 n.95 (indicating that time is not only factor determining extent of integration).
60 Improvements made to the target by the buyer subsequent to the merger pose a
perplexing and unresolved problem for both divestiture and rescission. See Elzinga, supra
note 56, at 59-61. Because courts often do not implement antimerger remedies until years
after the acquisition, buyers will almost certainly have added to or at least repaired targets,
if only to maintain their productivity. In its final order, a court should insist that the buyer
include these improvements, even if severable, in the return of the target to the original
seller to avoid requiring the seller to buy back an outmoded target. But the court should
also require the seller to pay a fair price for reasonable improvements made by the buyer.
The seller would normally have incurred these expenses if he had owned the target
throughout. To rule otherwise might discourage a target buyer, fearful of a rescission
order, from making necessary repairs thereby allowing the target to atrophy. See Pfunder,
Plaine & Wittemore, supra note 51, at 90-92. Nevertheless, the court must evaluate and
price the improvements, which will impede the administration of a rescission order.
61 See, e.g., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (purchaser acquired
"Clorox" tradename and goodwill of past advertising); Farm Journal Inc., 53 F.T.C. 26
(1956) (purchaser acquired subscription list and right to solicit substitution of buyer's
magazine for unexpired subscriptions of defunct seller's magazine). An efficient holdseparate order will, of course, deter intermingling regardless of the nature of the target.
However, if the hold-separate order has some leaks (see note 75 infra), the nature of the
target may transform those leaks into floods.

1979]

RESCISSION DECISION

747

deter its intermingling with the buyer's original assets. For example, even though the government sought divestiture in Ford Motor
Co. v. United States, 62 the case seems to have met three, and
perhaps all four, of the prerequisites to rescission. First, Ford and
Electric Autolite continued to exist after the merger. Second, the
sale of the target represented only nineteen percent of the seller's
total assets;63 he should have been able to repay the money he
received. Third, the government moved against the merger within
six months of its consummation; 6 4 this delay may have rendered
rescission infeasible, depending on the extent of intermingling.
Fourth, the target consisted of an entire spark plug factory and
an entire battery plant, neither of which lent themselves to assimilation by the buyer.
B. Effectiveness
The Supreme Court requires a court to employ an antimerger remedy effective to restore competition, regardless of its
impact on private interests.65 When rescission is feasible, it may
be a more effective remedy than divestiture.6 6 Contrary to the
Supreme Court's pronouncement in duPont, divestiture is not

405 U.S. 562 (1972).
'3 Electric Autolite's assets at the time of the acquisition totaled approximately
$150,000,000. United States v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F. Supp. 407, 410 n.10 (E.D. Mich.
1968), aff'd, 405 U.S. 562 (1972). The sale price of the target was $28,000,000 (id. at 408),
or 19% of Electric Autolite's assets.
64 Id. at 411.
65 United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326 (1961) (courts
"are authorized, indeed required, to decree relief effective to redress the violations, whatever the adverse effect of such a decree on private interests"). Nonetheless, the fact that a
court can only retain as defendants those persons who were parties to the merger limits
this power to obtain effective antimerger relief. See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
66 An imaginative reading of duPont dicta suggests that a court need not select the most
effective remedy. The Court stated that "[e]conomic hardship can influence choice only
among two or more effective remedies." 366 U.S. at 327. This may imply that if two or
more remedies attain a threshold level of effectiveness, a court must choose the one that
interferes the least with private interests. The same reasons that make rescission easy to
apply-prescribed parties, prearranged price-make it more destructive of private interests than divestiture. A divestiture order interferes only with the property interests of
the target purchaser. Rescission interferes with both the purchaser's and seller's property
interests; not only must the purchaser sell the acquired target, but the buyer must repurchase it. Under the above interpretation of the duPont dicta, a court may order rescission
only when it is the sole effective remedy. This limitation narrows the use of rescission only
slightly; divestiture has been an ineffective remedy. See notes 67-73 and accompanying text
infra.
62
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"simple, relatively easy to administer, and sure." 67 Divestiture
requires a court to decide exactly what to divest and under what
guidelines. The government supervises compliance with these
guidelines and seeks court enforcement if they are ignored. 8
More troublesome than these procedural burdens is evidence that
divestiture has rarely achieved a pro-competitive result. Both the
Elzinga study 69 and the Pfunder study 70 concluded that at least
17 See 366 U.S. at 331. Cf. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061,
1074 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) ("Divestiture is usually fraught with difficulties and presents a whole
range of problems which should be avoided if possible.")
18 See Pfunder, Plaine & Wittemore, supra note 51, at 97-98, 108-11.
69 Elzinga, supra note 56. After developing a population of all § 7 cases filed after 1950
and resolved by 1964, either by a consent decree or a litigated order (39 cases), Elzinga
categorized the relief obtained as either Successful, Sufficient, Deficient, or Unsuccessful.
Elzinga's criteria for Successful relief required that the divestiture order reestablish the
target as an independently viable firm. Elzinga assumed that this could only occur if the
target was purchased by "some individual, group, or corporation [who has no] ties, either
in a horizontal or vertical sense, with the industry of the firm being acquired." Id. at 47.
Elzinga also required that the purchaser not already be a "corporate congomerate," defined as a firm listed as one of Fortune's top 200 manufacturing firms. The criteria for the
remaining categories were:
Sufficient-target sold to a small horizontal competitor, or sold as a market or
product extension, or sold as a conglomerate acquisition.
Deficient-target sold in such a manner that potential competition is reduced,
or government fails to obtain divestiture of the entire illegally acquired target.
Unsuccessful-no or insignificant divestiture, or sold to a significant horizontal
competitor, or the target sold is no longer a viable entity.
Elzinga concluded that 10 of the 39 divestiture orders resulted in Successful or Sufficient
relief, 8 produced Deficient relief, and 21 resulted in Unsuccessful relief.
Elzinga then introduced time as a factor in his evaluation. He argued that "[a]s long as
an anticompetitive acquisition remains consummated, the incremental market power can be
used by the acquiring firm." Id. at 45. Under this formula, only 5 divestiture orders
achieved Successful or Sufficient relief, 4 resulted in Deficient relief, and 30 produced
Unsuccessful relief.
A Nader Study Group Report of Antitrust Enforcement agrees wholeheartedly with
Elzinga's analysis and conclusion that divestiture is ineffective in restoring competition to
the industry. See M. GREEN, B. MOORE & B. WASSERSTEIN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM
ch. 6 (1972).
70 Pfunder, Plaine & Wittemore, supra note 51. The Pfunder study analyzed 114 cases
instituted after 1950 and resolved prior to 1970. The study found that only 16% of the
cases resulted in the "sale of all or part of the asset ordered divested to a newly formed
corporation backed by a group of independent investors or by former independent owners." Id. at 37-38. This category is similar to Elzinga's Successful category. See note 69 supra.
Pfunder also discovered that in 17% of the cases, the divestiture ordered did not occur or
occurred only with serious modification. Pfunder, Plaine & Wittemore, supra note 51, at 34.
In six cases, for example, the court finally withdrew its divestiture order because it held
that, due to delay, divestiture was no longer feasible. Id. at 42, n.30. The Pfunder study
concluded that "[an examination of 114 section 7 cases which have resulted in a litigated
or consent decree of divestiture suggests that the Government has failed to obtain an effective remedy in a substantial number of cases." Id. at 40.
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seventy-five percent of all divestiture decrees produced few or
no pro-competitive effects. The studies suggest three basic causes:
first, it is difficult to locate a pro-competitive buyer offering an
acceptable price; 71 second, it is difficult to unscramble a consummated merger; 7 2 and third, the defendant lacks an incentive to
comply with the divestiture order.7 3
Superficially, rescission is an alluring alternative. Rescission
returns each party to its original position, thereby reinstating the
market's original competitive structure. Furthermore, rescission
avoids the sources of divestiture's ineffectiveness.
Rescission sidesteps the first stumbling block to divestiturelocating an acceptable buyer. The buyer is the original seller. Rescission can also partially avoid the second impediment. The government, seeking either rescission or divestiture, can promptly
seek a hold-separate order. 74 But to the extent that the holdseparate order is not effective, 75 less intermingling will occur
when the court orders rescission, because the court can implement
rescission more quickly than divestiture. Divestiture involves locating a buyer and negotiating a price. " Both these factors are
predetermined under rescission; the court need only determine
the value of any improvements.
Rescission also seems to alleviate the third factor, the target
buyer's incentive to comply. Although it may want to delay compliance, 77 a target buyer faced with a rescission order has no excuse for delay. With divestiture, the target buyer may claim that

71

45-54.
72

See Elzinga, supra note 56, at 61-66; Pfunder, Plaine & Wittemore, supra note 51, at
See Elzinga, supra note 56, at 53-54; Pfunder, Plaine & Wittemore, supra note 51, at

54-77.
73 See Pfunder, Plaine & Wittemore, supra note 51, at 95-107. The Pfunder study also
listed court and prosecutorial leniency with the defendant as a factor in rendering divestiture ineffective. The study suggests that courts show excessive deference to the violator's
property interest in the target; courts steer clear of orders which may appear punitive and
they allow defendants to design and enforce the relief. See id. at 40-42.
74 See notes 57-58 and accompanying text supra.
" See United States v. White Consol. Indus. Inc., 323 F. Supp. 1397, 1399 (N.D. Ohio
1971) (hold-separate order could not maintain status quo pendente lite); United States v.
Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 569-70 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (hold-separate order
not used because it reduces competition pendente lite); Pfunder, Plaine & Wittemore, sup-a
note 51, at 77 n.85.
76 A court typically sets a time limit, often between 6 and 24 months after the decree,
within which the defendant must comply with the divestiture order. See Pfunder, Plaine &
Wittemore, supra note 51, at Appendix B. Nevertheless, even these lengthy limits are often
ignored with impunity. See id. at 92-94.
7 See Causes and Cures, supra note 51, at 76-83.
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no one has offered an acceptable price for the target. With rescission, the buyer is cornered into selling the target back to its original owner promptly, thereby restoring the industry's original
competitive structure.
The competitive structure will remain static only so long as
the original owner retains its reacquired target. Presumably, the
original owner initially sold the target because it preferred, for
one of any number of reasons, 7 8 to have the proceeds of the sale
instead of the target. The court's order cannot change the owner's
preference. Nonetheless, if the owner originally sold the target for
a price higher than fair market value-because the buyer paid
more in anticipation of oligopolistic profits 7 9 -the seller may not
be able to resell the target for the same high price. Even if the
seller is willing to settle for the fair market value, there may be no
other buyers with enough capital or desire to purchase the target.
In both cases, the seller may then decide to operate the business
again, thus restoring the competitive premerger status quo ante.
Even where the original owner intends to resell and willing
buyers exist, rescission is a more effective antimerger remedy because it places the burden of completing the sale on the party who
wants to sell. A divestiture order requires the target buyer to locate a divestiture buyer. The implementation and effectiveness of
the remedy depend on the party who wants to postpone divestiture as long as possible in order to extract ogligopolistic profits
from the target. Rescission, on the other hand, returns the target
to its original owner who then must locate a new buyer if he still
wants to get rid of it.
Shifting this burden may also deter a seller from making sales
that violate section 7. No longer could a target seller reap the
benefits of an anticompetitive sale for a higher than fair market
value price without risking the burden of undoing the transaction.
Rescission may also lessen the buyer's incentive to purchase a
target in violation of section 7. A buyer sometimes risks violating
section 7 with the hope that the government will not challenge the
acquisition, and the solace that even if it does, he can still delay

78 For example, the seller may have decided to sell because the business was unprofitable or in debt, or because it wanted to leave the market, either to enter another market or
to retire.
" A pro-competitive buyer can only anticipate normal profits from the acquisition. An
anticompetitive buyer expects abnormal profits because it maintains or increases its
oligopolistic power as a result of the purchase. An expectation of greater profits allows the
anticompetitive buyer to bid the price up.
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the remedy and profit from the target in the interim. 80 To the
extent that the buyer recognizes that rescission will deprive him of
the opportunity to delay the remedy and to set his own selling
price, he may be less willing to execute an anticompetitive merger.
Placing the burden of antimerger relief on the seller, who has
not violated section 7, may appear harsh. Nonetheless duPont
demands effective relief, regardless of its impact on private interests. 1 Once a court has retained the target seller as a defendant
and concluded that rescission is more effective than divestiture, it
is no defense that the remedy weighs heavily on the seller.
CONCLUSION

Courts seeking an antimerger remedy usually order divestiture, even though it has proven in many instances to be an unsatisfactory remedy. As an alternative structural remedy, courts
should consider rescission. Because of the effectiveness and ease
of administration of rescission, courts should retain target sellers
under the broad authority of section 15 of the Clayton Act and
order rescission whenever it is feasible-that is, when both parties
still exist after the merger, the consideration is intact, and the
buyer has not intermingled the target with its other assets. To
ensure that these prerequisites are met, the government should
secure a hold-separate order promptly. If courts employ rescission
when it is appropriate, antimerger prosecution will be more than
a futile exercise.
Raymond C. Zemlin

80 See Causes and Cures, supra note 51, at 76-83.
81

See 366 U.S. at 316; note 65 supra.

